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Neutralization theory, which explains internal excuse-making behavior, is adopted from criminology and policy 
compliance research and theoretically incorporated with a climate of silence model from extant whistleblowing 
research. Through an empirical test utilizing scenario-based field research, neutralization and climate of silence are 




Neutralization, whistleblowing, policy compliance, deterrence 
INTRODUCTION 
Why don’t more employees “blow the whistle”? Despite the years passed between the financial scandals of Enron, 
Tyco, WorldCom and others, whistle-blowing has remained in the public consciousness, evidenced by the U.S. 
Senate’s recent consideration of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (Adams and Mehta 2010). Indeed, 
articles related to whistle-blowing continue to appear in academic publications, and the U.S. Department of Labor's 
Ethics Resource Center in their 2009 National Business Ethics Survey noted more employees reported misconduct 
(63%) compared with 2007 (58%). “Whistle-blowing,” is defined as disclosure of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate 
practices that are under employer control, whether by former or current organization members to persons or 
organizations that may be able to effect action (Near and Miceli 1996). Although we may not typically think of it in 
these terms, this definition includes reporting of conduct to one’s supervisor or manager. In addition, this definition 
encompasses not only disclosure of fraud, as in many well-publicized corporate scandals, but also personnel issues, 
including sexual harassment. The same study also found that of those who reported misconduct, 75% reported it 
internally (46% to direct supervisor), which is not protected under the current federal Whistleblower Protection Act, 
while only 4% of employees who disclosed misconduct were willing to report it outside their organization. Lest this 
level of reporting seem high, the 2009 Global Economic Crime Survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers indicated only 
34% of financial fraud was detected through some whistle-blowing related procedure, about half of which was 
reported internally. This demonstrates the marked necessity of whistle-blowers; the same survey reported financial 
audits uncovered only about a quarter of detected fraud. 
Risk of reprisal against the whistleblower has a deterring effect. Nearly every report of whistle-blowing highlights 
the negative consequences whistle-blowers face, from being ostracized in the workplace to demotion, job loss, 
psychiatric referrals, and law suits. Such outcomes clearly indicate that despite the Whitsleblowing Protection Act, 
the threats of reprisal play a significant role in employees choosing not to report when they otherwise might. Given 
the realm of potential negative consequences it is surprising any whistle-blowing occurs at all. 
The empirical causes for reluctance to transmit bad news (a broader category of which whistle-blowing is a subset) 
are only partially understood. Decision researchers have identified several factors in whistle-blowing decisions, 
including age, gender, work experience, work climate, expectations of retaliation, etc. (Near et al. 1996). 
Organizational policies and managerial practices have also been shown to be strongly correlated with a similar 
construct, organizational silence (Morrison and Milliken 2000; Park and Keil 2009). In a similar vein, policy 
compliance research in Information Systems settings introduced neutralization techniques as reasons for employee 
decisions (Siponen and Vance 2010). This paper investigates whether neutralization behavior can predict whistle-
blowing intention. 
                                                          
*
 Authors are grateful for the guidance of Dr. Mark Keil during early stages of this research. 
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THEORY BACKGROUND 
Neutralization Theory 
Neutralization Theory was first described by Sykes and Matza (1957), and is a popular framework within 
criminology for understanding deviant behavior. At its core, Neutralization Theory enumerates five justification 
techniques: (1) Denial of Responsibility, where the offender asserts a lack of responsibility because the act is 
accidental or otherwise beyond reasonable control; (2) Denial of Injury where the offender asserts no actual harm 
was inflicted so the act should be considered acceptable; (3) Denial of the Victim, where the offender asserts the 
victim of the acts deserves the consequences; (4) Condemnation of the Condemners ‘‘shifts attention from the 
deviant’s transgressions to the hypocrisy and moral failings of those who disapprove of the violations’’ (Hollinger 
1991); and (5) Appeal to Higher Loyalties, where the offender justifies the act according to the standard of a 
particular subgroup (e.g. family, shareholders, company, union, gang, religion), rather than by societal norms (Sykes 
et al. 1957). Other researchers have added Metaphor of the Ledger, where the offender rationalizes that many prior 
“good” acts allow an occasional “bad” act to be overlooked (Klockars 1974), and Defense of Necessity, where “if an 
act is perceived as necessary, then one need not feel guilty about its commission, even if it’s considered morally 
wrong in the abstract” (Minor 1981). 
Neutralization and Deterrence Theory 
Application of neutralization often goes side-by side with measures of deterrents, although perhaps this is due to the 
long history of deterrence theory in IS policy compliance research. In Deterrence Theory, actions are proscribed by 
the presence of three kinds of deterrents: (1) formal sanctions, which in organizational behavior terms might be 
described as formal action, likely predicted by organizational policy, and applied through processes measurable by 
procedural justice; (2) informal sanctions, meaning the social responses to wrongdoing such as ostracism, and (3) 
personal shame for acting inconsistently with one’s perception of a moral self. According to Deterrence Theory, 
compliance with organizational or societal rules is best predicted by two attributes of these deterrents (sanctions), 
namely certainty and severity (Siponen Pahnila and Mahmood 2007), similar to how risks are differentiated based 
on their probability and impact. According to deterrence theory, individuals acting in the presence of sanctions 
engage in a cost-benefit analysis. As certainty of sanctions increased, for example due to an increased probability of 







Figure 1: Simplified model from Siponen & Vance (2010) 
 
Despite the prevalence of the deterrence approach, several studies have found little to no effect in preventing 
unwanted behavior, and specifically, that the effect of formal sanctions is less meaningful than the effect of informal 
sanctions. Within literature on information systems policy compliance, Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan and Wei (2003) found 
no support for deterrence severity as a predictor when compared with man-hours spent on security. Hollinger(1991), 
similar to Siponen and Vance (2010), found neutralization to be a better predictor than sanctions. Pahnila, Siponen 
& Mahmood (2007) found no support for deterrence when normative beliefs were measured. And in examinations of 
white-collar crime, Piquero, Tibbetts, and Blankenship (2005) included a deterrence control variable in their 
measures of neutralization, but found no significant deterrence effect of formal sanctions on behavior. In short, 
deterrence alone is usually a poor (but occasionally significant) predictor of compliance, and in every study jointly 
measuring neutralization, its effects are typically insignificant or negligible. 
Most studies of neutralization and policy compliance in a corporate context also recognize the presence of deterrents 
(e.g., Hollinger 1991; Piquero et al. 2005), even if little deterring effect is found in the present of neutralization. 
Siponen and Vance (2010), researching policy compliance and using a more detailed version of the variance model 
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displayed in Figure 1, examined the combined effects of deterrence and neutralization as compared with deterrence 
alone. 
Neutralization and Whistleblowing 
Having been used in a context of IS security policy (Siponen et al. 2010), the application of neutralization to 
whistleblowing (i.e. reporting bad news) is straightforward. Work by Dozier and Micelli (1985) and Smith, Keil, and 
Depledge (2001) argued that in deciding whether to report bad behavior (i.e. “blow the whistle”), an individual first 
determines whether the action ought to be reported, and if so, determines whether he or she has a personal 










Figure 2: From (Smith et al. 2001), adapted from (Dozier et al. 1985) 
In other words, the model theorized by Smith, et al. (2001) represents a cost-benefit analysis similar to that theorized 
by deterrence theory. Thus, just as neutralization and deterrence are studied together in policy compliance, it is 
reasonable to investigate neutralization in the presence of those deterrence represented by climate of silence. 
Deterrence constructs—which sanction violation of policy (formal sanctions), cultural norms (informal sanctions), 
or values (personal shame)—are logically consistent with reasons individuals are deterred from reporting bad news, 
namely, formal reprisal, cultural norms (peer reprisal), and personal values (e.g. guilt at being a “snitch”).  
For this conceptualization of neutralization in a whistleblowing context, a subset of the constructs defined by Sykes 
and Mata (1957) and other researchers is used, as not all of these constructs translate well (e.g., “metaphor of the 
ledger,” introduced by Klockars (1974)). Consistent with Siponen and Vance (2010), denial of the victim is 
excluded. Most studies utilizing neutralization theory have used a subset of neutralization techniques (Cao 2004). 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
The whistleblowing model described in Figure 1 is subject to neutralization decisions in the first two steps of the 
model. Specifically, when determining whether an action ought to be reported, one might apply the neutralization 
techniques of “denial of the victim,” “denial of injury,” or “defense of necessity.” In the second stage, assessing 
personal responsibility, one might apply the techniques of denial of responsibility” or “appeal to higher loyalties.” 
Thus, the cost-benefit determinations shown to be rationale for a potential whistleblower’s decision to report (or not) 
might reasonably be affected by neutralization techniques. 
In addition to the decisions of responsibility described earlier, studies of whistleblowing have also determined 
decision-makers engage in a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the potential costs of reporting (or not reporting) 
(Dozier et al. 1985; Farrell and C 1982). This weighing of costs and benefits is another opportunity for individuals to 
apply neutralization techniques.  
Our first objective is to demonstrate alignment with these studies. Previous work has framed neutralization as a 
multi-dimensional second order construct formatively composed of reflective sub-constructs (see e.g., Siponen et al. 
2010 for a complete explanation). Using this description, the sub-constructs may be aggregated into a single 
indicator of neutralization. 
Hypothesis 1. Climate of silence is negatively related to willingness to report. 
Hypothesis 2. Neutralization is negatively related to willingness to report. 
Of course, part of the intent of this study was to validate a combined model. Dependent constructs in both 
hypothesized relationships are the same. As the independent constructs neutralization and climate of silence measure 
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different aspects of the reporting decision (namely, individual neutralization behavior and organizational 
influences), their effect on willingness to report should be complementary (see Figure 3). 


















Figure 3: Proposed combined model. 
METHODOLOGY 
Volunteer participants were recruited from an information systems course required of business students and open to 
all university students at a large urban public university in the southeastern United States. Among the 108 
participants, 53% were male; the mean age was 21.3 (σ = 5.2; min=18; max=65). 
Previous research has demonstrated students are adequate subjects from which to generalize (Gordon Slade and 
Schmitt 1986; Greenberg 1987). The scenario design anticipated student participants and utilized an internship 
context to increase both familiarity and external validity. Although generalizability is a concern, Lynch (1999) has 
observed: “Findings from single real-world settings and specific sets of ‘real’ people are no more likely to generalize 
than are findings from single laboratory settings with student subjects. Just as in the laboratory, the real world varies 
in background facets of subject characteristics, setting, context, relevant history, and time”. The study was pilot-
tested to ensure clarity. 
Participants were provided with role-playing scenario describing the accidental discovery of potential wrongdoing 
during an internship opportunity. The scenario was constructed in consultation with a professor specializing in 
whistleblowing and business decision-making. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two treatments: one 
describing a high-cost for reporting (i.e., blowing the whistle; n = 52) indicative of a high climate of silence, and one 
describing a low-cost for reporting consistent with a low climate of silence (n = 56). A manipulation check shows 
respondents perceived the impact of consequences to be different between the two scenarios (p = .001). 
Excepting a final open-answer field and some demographic questions, responses were recorded on a seven-point 
Likert-type scale. Items were adapted from previously validated instruments (Park et al. 2009; Siponen et al. 2010). 
A list of instrument questions use in this analysis is provided in Appendix A. 
Likert responses were treated as continuous. All constructs were multiple-item measures, and were averaged (mean) 
after reverse measures were transformed. A single response was excluded as unusable as the subject provided 
identical responses for all questions, including reverse scored items. 
Analysis 
A brief examination of the descriptive statistics showed all responses were within the expected range. Descriptive 
statistics for the study variables and along with correlations and reliability scores are represented in Table 1. 
Age, gender and work experience were included as it was previously demonstrated these variables were weakly 
correlated with willingness to report (e.g., Park et al. 2009), but this was not a case in this sample. Gender was only 
significantly correlated with defensive necessity (B=0.20; p < 0.05) and age was only significantly related with work 
experience (b=0.90; p < 0.01). The variable  
CostBen refers to the cost-benefit analysis individuals perform when making reporting decisions, and was included 
as a potential correlate based on past studies (Smith et al. 2001). 
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Deviation 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Age 21.26 5.147 1      
2. Gender (Male=1) .53 .520 -.076 1     
3. Climate of Silence 3.6420 1.17935 .080 .006 1    
4. Neutralization 3.4407 1.18158 .018 .155 0.323** 1   
5. Willingness to Report 4.6296 1.48571 .070 -.150 -0.559** -0.504** 1 
Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis included principle component analysis with iterations for commonality and Varimax rotation using 
the entire sample. First, extracted factors with eigenvalues greater than one returned four components with some 
weaknesses related to convergent validity, as some items were ranged below 0.7. However, the lack of convergence 
of some items was expected, and it is unsurprising that the neutralization items flocked together. The three 
dimensions of climate of silence grouped together, along with a similar single-item measure, cost-benefit analysis. 
To further demonstrate discriminant validity, measured were forced in to four-factor through eight-factor solutions. 
In examining this structure, it became clear that NDenR4 (a dimension of denial of responsibility), which was added 
to supplement previously validated items was misbehaving; as it lacked requisite validity, it was dropped. After 
dropping this measure for lack of convergence, a seven-factor structure (Appendix B, Table B2) most cleanly 
matched the theorized constructs. The variable NDefN2 (defense of necessity) was also misbehaving, although only 
slightly. On reviewing its associated measure, it was clear that the question related to financial costs to the 
organization, which were not made explicit in the scenario. Thus, this variable was also removed. After dropping 
these two items and re-running the seven-component structure, CB2_rev declined from .80 to .42 and converged 
with Climate of Silence construct as it is theoretically predicted to do. Although it was below the traditionally 
acceptable level (0.7) it was kept within the climate of silence construct, first, in order to maintain alignment with 
previous research (e.g., Park et al. 2009), and second, because climate of silence may be interpreted as a formative 
construct. In all, these analyses, along with principal component analysis and Chronbach’s alpha calculations (see 
Table B3 & Table B4) show good convergent and discriminant validity for all items.  
Lastly, even though the neutralization items were distinct they were still tightly clustered. A factor analysis both as a 
single construct and as independent constructs leading to a latent second-order construct was performed, as 
described by Siponen and Vance (2010). The results demonstrated that neutralizations items grouped in combined 
analysis also converged with the appropriate construct in separate factor analysis. The factor analysis for 
neutralization shows that all items representing different constructs converged into single component structure. 
Moreover, separate component analysis of neutralization confirmed the need for deletion of the items (discussed 
above), which were not converging in overall model. (See Appendix B) 
RESULTS 
An ANCOVA was conducted to explore the impact of Neutralization and Climate of Silence on subjects’ 
willingness to report (See Table 2). 
The effects from covariates were marginal. Gender was insignificant (p = 0.732) with an almost meaningless effect 
size (η
2
 = 0.002). However, Age was significant, with a small effect (p = 0.006; partial η
2
 = 0.103).  
Using combined model as a basis for evaluating the hypothesis, Neutralization explained a meaningful portion of 
variance (partial η
2
 = 0.521) and was strongly significant (p = 0.003), confirming Hypothesis 1. Additionally, 
Climate of Silence explained 27% of dependent variance with strong significance (p < 0.001), confirming 
Hypothesis 2. As predicted, the combined model was significant over all (p < 0.001), and explained 69% of the 
variance in willingness to report, confirming Hypothesis 3. 
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DISCUSSION 
As expected, Neutralization and Climate of Silence were both determined to be significant predictors of Willingness 
to Report, and combined to strongly predict the whistleblowing decision. 
Although in this experiment evidence suggests neutralization is a predictor of willingness to report, there is some 
question in the criminology stream of neutralization literature regarding the predictive ability of neutralization in 
anticipating actual deviance, rather than simply tolerance of it, as measured in studies like this one. As Maruna and 
Copes (2005) point out, the original conceptualization of neutralization by Sykes and Matz (1957) is post hoc, or in 
other words, that neutralizations are behaviors that occur following commission of an act. According to the 
historical understanding of this theory, neutralization can only occur after the act because there is no action to 
excuse ex ante. (Although in moral disengagement literature (e.g., Bandura Barbaranelli Caprara and Pastorelli 
1996) the argument is made that the justification may also precede the act. Still, the call by Maruna and Copes 
(2005) for longitudinal research is certainly warranted. 
Interestingly, in a study of street criminals, Topalli (2005) discovered young offenders used neutralization behavior 
to rationalize behavior deviant in their context. More specifically, despite being aware of conventional values, 
offenders tended to neutralize conventionally recognized good behavior separate from the criminally deviant norm 
of their context. This has interesting implications when applied to climate of silence and neutralization in a whistle-
blowing context that should be further explored. For example, in a context with a high climate of silence, Topalli’s 
(2005) findings suggest the act of blowing the whistle may trigger neutralization behavior as opposed with a 
conventional frame of reference where not blowing the whistle might be considered a deviant act that might trigger 
neutralization. This is in contrast to Robinson and Kraatz (1998), who found neutralization techniques were used 
more frequently in organizations with weak behavioral norms 
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APPENDIX A: INSTRUMENT 
Questions used in this study are replicated in the table below. 
* Denotes reverse-coded question 
Consequences (MC) 1. Speaking up about the fraudulent reporting could be dangerous for my career at 
S2DEV. 
*2. If I decide to inform my supervisor of the bug, S2DEV’s management will react 
positively to my decision.  
Willingness to report 
(WtR) 
3. At this time, how likely are you to go directly to your supervisor to report the 
bad news concerning your findings? 
*4. Please indicate how likely it is that you would avoid telling your supervisor the 
bad news. 
Neutralization: Denial of 
Responsibility (NDenR) 
14. It is okay to not report your findings if you aren’t sure what the reporting policy 
is. 
15. It is okay to not report your findings if the reporting policy is not advertised 
internally . 
16. It is okay to not report your findings if you don’t understand the company’s 
reporting policy. 
17. It is okay to not report your findings because the problem will be discovered 
eventually. 
Neutralization: Denial of 
Injury (NDInj) 
20. It is okay to not report your findings if no damage is done to your company. 
21. It is okay to not report your findings if no one gets hurt. 
Neutralization: Defense of 
Necessity (NDefN) 
22. It is all right to not report your findings under circumstances where it seems like 
you have little other choice. 
23. It is okay to not report your findings because reporting problems will cost my 
company money. 




*26. Choose the options that best reflects the relationship between the costs and 
benefits of reporting your findings (seven point Likert from “Benefits would 
greatly exceed costs” to “Costs would greatly exceed benefits” 
27. Speaking up about the fraudulent reporting would be worth the effort. 
 29. Age 
 30. Gender (M/F) 
First author’s last name (use et al. if more than one authors)  Neutralization and Whistleblowing 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table B 1: Factor analysis following variable deletion 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Denial of 
Responsibility 
NDenR1 .866 .201 .102 -.036 -.161 .030 
 NDenR2 .809 .212 .262 .144 -.091 -.022 
 NDenR3 .782 .244 .211 .010 .339 .055 
Defense of 
Necessity 
NDefN1 .251 .268 .747 .095 -.162 .108 
 NDefN3 .187 .153 .856 .067 .111 .056 
Denial of Injury NDInj1 .241 .859 .315 .028 .065 .010 
 NDInj2 .326 .871 .152 .115 .047 .058 
 Age -.028 .057 -.038 .067 .961 -.038 
 Gender (Male=1) .027 .048 .120 -.041 -.036 .987 
Climate of Silence MC2_unr .116 .002 -.082 .861 -.036 -.057 
 MC1 -.099 .065 .216 .778 .160 -.014 
 CB2_rev  .182 .325 .433 .481 -.111 .108 
 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 









Table B 3: Chronbach’s alpha of composite constructs (after deletion) 
Denial of responsibility *0.843 
Denial of injury 0.891 
Defense of necessity *0.703 
Climate of silence  0.616 
* Prior to deletion, α for Denial of 
responsibility was 0.829; for defense of 
necessity α was 0.733. 
 
